Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation by Blank, Joshua D. & Zacks, Eric A.
Volume 110 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 110, 
2005-2006 
6-1-2005 
Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action 
Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation 
Joshua D. Blank 
Eric A. Zacks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action 
Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 DICK. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol110/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
I Articles
Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach
to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal
Services Corporation
Joshua D. Blank and Eric A. Zacks*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............................................................................................... . . 2
1I. The Legal Services Corporation and the 1996 Restrictions ........................ 4
A. The History of the Legal Services Corporation ......................................... 4
B. The 1996 Congressional Restrictions on the Legal Service Corporation ....... 6
III. The Class Action as a Legal Device ......................................................... 9
A. Legal and Social Benefits of the Class Action Device ............................ 10
B. Drawbacks to the Class Action Device .................................................... 14
IV. Assessment of the Class Action Restriction ............................................ 17
* Joshua D. Blank is an Associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. B.A., New
York University, 1999; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. Eric A. Zacks is an Associate at
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP. B.A., University of Michigan, 1998; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 2002. The authors are grateful to Jeanne Chain and Robert Levels
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The authors would also like to
thank Laura K. Abel of the Brennan Center for Justice for providing insight into the
Brennan Center's current litigation regarding the constitutionality of the class action
restriction. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be
attributed to the authors' firms or their clients.
© 2005 Joshua D. Blank and Eric A. Zacks. All rights reserved.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
A . The Social Im pact .................................................................................. 17
B . The Legal Im pact ..................................................................................... 21
C. The Professional Im pact ......................................................................... 27
V. Alternatives and Proposed Solutions ...................................................... 29
A. Revision the 1996 Restrictions ................................................................ 29
B. Com pliance Strategies ............................................................................ 32
C. Com m unity Education .............................................................................. 33
V I. C oncluion ............................................................................................... 38
The class action lawsuit has emerged as an effective legal device for
addressing common harms. Claimants who might not litigate their
claims individually are empowered by the opportunity to speak with
one voice. The class action device, however, has been made largely
unavailable to legal services lawyers representing the poor.
Congressional restrictions enacted in 1996 prohibit legal services
organizations that receive federal funding from the Legal Services
Corporation from using that funding to initiate or participate in any
class action lawsuit. This article examines the social, legal and
professional impact of the class action restriction on the Legal
Services Corporation and on the recipients of its funding. This
article concludes that the class action restriction has adversely
affected the poor and, consequently, should be reconsidered. In the
event that the class action restriction is not revised or repealed, this
article suggests practical alternative strategies for delivering
effective group representation to the poor.
I. Introduction
Common harms inspire collective action. Defective automobile
tires, toxic dietary supplements and fraudulent accounting practices are
just a few of the many harms that motivate the masses to act collectively.
When such common harms strike, the affected individuals often turn to
the class action lawsuit as a means of seeking redress. The class action
lawsuit empowers the affected class, while enhancing the efficiency of
the litigation system. Yet, despite the benefits of the class action lawsuit
to both claimants and the courts, this legal tool has effectively been made
unavailable to legal services lawyers representing the poor.
The poor have been unable to utilize the class action lawsuit as a
legal mechanism for instituting change because Congress has restricted
the vast majority of legal services organizations from engaging in class
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action lawsuits. Legal services organizations-non-profit providers of
free legal services-are a key source of legal representation for the poor.
Many of these organizations depend on federal funds distributed by the
Legal Services Corporation (the "LSC"), a private non-profit corporation
established by Congress. In 1996, in addition to reducing dramatically
the amount of federal funding distributed from the LSC to legal services
organizations, Congress imposed significant restrictions (the "1996
Restrictions") on the types of activities for which LSC funds could be
used. One of these restrictions prohibits LSC-funded legal services
organizations from using federal funds to initiate or participate in any
class action lawsuit.'
As a result of the 1996 legislation, many class action lawsuits
maintained by legal services offices were dropped or referred to private
firms.2 It is probable that since 1996, legal services lawyers have been
prevented from filing a significant number of potential class action
lawsuits. Class action lawsuits were seen by some as an effective and
efficient tool available to legal services lawyers in representing their
clients. Class action lawsuits enabled legal services lawyers to aggregate
small individual claims that addressed common harms, rather than
litigating them individually. Class action lawsuits, however, were more
than a method of legal aid for many in the poor community. They also
were a conduit through which the poor's political voices could be heard
by often intimidating regulatory agencies.
The impacts of the class action restriction have resonated
throughout the public interest legal world.3 The 1996 Restrictions
implicate not only the poor community's constitutional right of access to
the courts, but also private donors' First Amendment freedom of speech
rights. The 1996 Restrictions have also raised a number of ethical
dilemmas for legal services lawyers. Finally, the scarce resources of
legal services offices have been stretched even further in an effort to
comply with the 1996 Restrictions.
This article argues that the 1996 Restrictions on class action
1. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2000) ("Recipients [of LSC funding] are prohibited
from initiating or participating in any class action"). A "class action" is defined as "a
lawsuit filed as, or otherwise declared by the court having jurisdiction over the case to be,
a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
comparable State statute or rule of civil procedure applicable in the court in which the
action is filed." 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(a) (2000).
2. See infra Part IV-A.
3. For a description of studies examining the effects of the 1996 Restrictions, see
Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts?
Some Implications for Judges When Funding Restrictions Curb Advocacy By Lawyers on
Behalf of the Poor; 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873 (2002) [hereinafter Abel & Udell, If You
Gag the Lawyers].
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lawsuits by LSC-funded organizations have adversely impacted the
delivery of legal services to the poor. The article will offer a critical
analysis of the value of class action lawsuits as a legal tool for the poor
and will also recommend practical strategies that LSC-funded legal
services programs can use to responsibly institute class actions.
Part II of this article will describe the development of the Legal
Services Corporation and the 1996 Restrictions. Part III will analyze and
discuss the legal and social benefits and drawbacks of the class action
device. Next, Part IV will assess the social, legal, and professional issues
that have arisen as a result of the 1996 Restrictions. Lastly, Part V will
present multi-faceted alternatives to the current system. Towards that
end, short-term goals, such as revising the 1996 Restrictions, will be
presented along with long-term strategies, such as community education,
that will refocus the LSC towards providing legal assistance that better
addresses the problems of the poor community. Part VI will conclude by
recommending that the class action restriction be repealed or that, in the
absence of repeal, the legal services community develop an alternative
means of advocacy to fill the void created by the class action restriction.
II. The Legal Services Corporation and the 1996 Restrictions
Before assessing the impact of the LSC's class action restriction on
the delivery of legal services to the poor, it is helpful to review the
history of the LSC and the 1996 Restrictions.
A. The History of the Legal Services Corporation
The LSC is a private, non-profit corporation that Congress
established in 1974 for "the purpose of providing financial support for
legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons
financially unable to afford legal assistance."4 The concept of the LSC
as a vehicle for providing federal funding to support legal services for the
poor grew out of the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, an important creation of President Lyndon B. Johnson's
War on Poverty Acts.5 Today, the LSC distributes federal funds to
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1994). For a more detailed history of the LSC, see
Charles J. Cooper and Michael A. Carvin, The Price of "Political Independence": The
Unconstitutional Status of the Legal Services Corporation, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 13
(1994); Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL
L. REV. 681 (1976); Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal
Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST L.J. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Failinger &
May, Litigating Against Poverty]; and John A. Dooley & Alan W. Houseman, LEGAL
SERVICES HISTORY (1984).
5. See CHARLES K. ROWLEY, THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 6-11 (1992); William P. Quigley, The Demise of
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qualifying legal services organizations throughout the United States. The
President of the United States appoints the eleven members of the LSC's
board of directors, and the U.S. Senate confirms them.6 By law, the
LSC's board of directors must be bipartisan, as no more than six of its
members may be of the same political party.7
The LSC does not, however, deliver legal services through a
centralized delivery system.8 Instead, the LSC funds approximately one
hundred eighty local programs, which serve one to two million indigent
clients annually. 9 The boards of these local programs hire their own
executive directors, who in turn hire a staff of attorneys and non-
attorneys. In addition to LSC funding, many local programs also receive
funds from private sources, such as law firms and corporations. Other
funding sources include state and local governments, Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts ("IOLTA") programs, and individual donors.' When an
organization accepts LSC funding, however, it must abide by both the
LSC's internally-created regulations and any Congressional mandates. 1
In an attempt to create a separate and distinct organization to deliver
legal services to the poor using federal funds, Congress required that the
LSC "be kept free from the influence of or use by it of political
pressures."'12  In the years preceding the creation of the LSC, some
Congressmen opposed burdening the LSC with any restrictions that
would prevent recipients of its funding from pursuing cases based on
their subject matter. Such restrictions, they contended, could prevent the
poor from obtaining access to the legal system, resulting in the mere
faqade of justice. In a 1973 Congressional debate regarding the creation
of the LSC, Pennsylvania Representative Edward Biester argued that any
restrictions could "discourage lawyers from assuming controversial
Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporation
From the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 241 (1998) [hereinafter
Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid].
6. For rules governing the LSC, see Legal Services Corporation, at
http://www.1sc.gov/welcome/wel who.htm (last visited May 16, 2005).
7. Id.
8. See Fiscal Year 1997 Testimony of House of Representative Appropriations For
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 104th
Cong. 208 (1996) (statement of Alexander D. Forger, President, Legal Services
Corporation).
9. See id.
10. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.2(d)-(f) (2000) (defining such sources as "non-LSC
funds").
11. See id. § 1610.1 (2000).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(5) (1994). See also id. § 2996e(b)(3) (prohibiting the LSC
from "interfer[ing] with any attorney in carrying out his professional responsibilities to
his client as established in the Canons of Ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility").
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cases, the kinds of cases which may, for instance, question the actions of
those who exert power or influence in the community.'
3
Despite attempts to immunize the LSC from political forces, the
controversy over the use of federal funds to provide legal assistance to
the poor has continued for decades. While the Carter administration
increased funding for the LSC and generally supported its goals, the
Reagan administration attempted to eliminate the LSC completely in
1982.14 Although its efforts failed in that respect, the Reagan
administration succeeded in significantly reducing the LSC's annual
budget and making "a number of other changes ostensibly designed to
rein in the perceived left-wing radicals allegedly in- control of legal
services programs across the country."' 5
After the November elections of 1994, efforts to dismantle the LSC
were reborn when Republicans regained the majority in both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. As the 1996 presidential
election neared, Congress and President Clinton agreed that the LSC
would continue to exist, but with drastically reduced funding and severe
restrictions on the types of legal actions in which it could be involved.'
6
For fiscal year 1996, the LSC's budget was reduced from $400 million to
$278 million.'
7
To the surprise of many historic supporters of the LSC, the
administration of George W. Bush has been strongly supportive of the
program. In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Bush administration
requested that Congress allocate $329.3 million to the LSC.' 8 The House
Appropriations Subcommittee accepted the President's request, and
Congress passed his proposed allocation with almost no debate. 9
Despite its financial support, however, the Bush administration has not
advocated the repeal of the many restrictions, including those imposed
by Congress on the LSC in 1996.
B. The 1996 Congressional Restrictions on the Legal Services
Corporation
In the fall of 1996, after months of contentious debate, the
13. 119 Cong. Rec. 20,688 (1973).
14. See Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid, supra
note 5, at 256. For further discussion of the Reagan administration's opposition to the
LSC, see Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public Service
in Illinois, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 7 (1995) [hereinafter Dailing, Their Finest Hour].
15. See Dailing, Their Finest Hour, supra note 14, at 21.
16. See id. at 23-24.
17. Legal Services Corporation, American Bar Association, available at





Republican-controlled U.S. Congress and President Clinton reached a
compromise on the future of the LSC. Under the Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (the "1996 OCRAA"),2 ° the
LSC was subjected to a thirty percent reduction in federal funding and
nineteen new restrictions on the types of clients and cases with which
grantees of LSC funding could be involved.21 These restrictions applied
to any legal services provider that received LSC funding.22 Although the
restrictions allowed LSC-funded legal service providers to use private
funds to participate in restricted activities, such as class action lawsuits,
they could only do so using facilities that were physically separate from
those in which LSC funds were used.23
The 1996 Restrictions explicitly prohibit grantees of LSC funding
from filing any class action lawsuits on behalf of clients, regardless of
the subject matter or type of defendant.24 Efforts to restrict the use of
government funds for class action lawsuits have been mirrored at the
state level. In Texas, for example, funds from the Texas Interest on
Lawyers Accounts and from the portion of court filing fees reserved for
the provision of civil services to low-income Texas residents can no
longer be used in connection with any state or federal class action
lawsuit.
25
In addition to the class action prohibition, the 1996 Restrictions also
ban legal services attorneys from attempting to influence federal, state, or
local government activities. Under the legislation, grantees of LSC funds
are not permitted to lobby for or against any executive order or any
federal, state, or local government regulation.26  Grantees are also
20. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
21. See id. § 504. It should be noted that Congress retained these restrictions for
Fiscal Year 1997.
22. See id. § 504(d)(1).
23. See 45 C.F.R. §1610.8 (2000). The impact of this requirement, however, may
have been softened somewhat by the decision in Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 349 F.
Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). In that case, the court issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of the three plaintiff legal services providers. Id. The injunction permitted some
overlap between facilities involving LSC-funded providers and those involving non-LSC-
funded providers so long as certain guidelines were followed. Id. It is unclear, however,
how legal services providers other than the three plaintiff organizations in this action will
be able to utilize the court's decision in their operations. Id.
24. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a)(7). Prior to the enactment of the 1996 legislation,
LSC grantees could participate in class action suits. The original LSC Act, however,
only allowed such participation with the permission of the director of the local legal
services office. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (1994).
25. See Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice,
at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheetclassact.html (May 10, 2000).
26. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a)(2).
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prohibited from attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any
legislation, constitutional amendment, or referendum.27
Grantees of LSC funding are also severely restricted from accepting
particular cases because of their subject matter. The LSC statute prior to
1996 prohibited grantees from accepting criminal cases, fee-generating
cases, and desegregation cases, among others. The 1996 Restrictions,
however, extended the prohibition to cases involving redistricting and
most cases related to assisted suicide. 28  The 1996 Restrictions also
prohibit all grantees from participating in any welfare-reform advocacy.
29
Consequently, under the statute, a legal services lawyer representing
clients befcre certain regulatory agencies would only be able to seek
relief according to those agencies' current regulations and could not
challenge the validity of the regulations themselves.
Reaction from legal services attorneys to the 1996 Restrictions was
swift and condemning. One attorney working for a legal services
organization commented that the "LSC [was] caving in to budgetary
blackmail," and that is why it failed to mount a serious challenge to the
new restrictions.30 Several legal commentators and academics have
argued that grantees of LSC funding should challenge the
constitutionality of the 1996 Restrictions. 31 It has even been claimed that
some local legal services organizations have simply ignored the class
action restriction.32
27. See id. § 504(a)(4).
28. See Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111
Stat. 23, § 5(b)(1)(E); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1643.3 (2000) ("No recipient may use LSC
funds to assist in, support, or fund any activity or service which has a purpose of assisting
in, or to bring suit or provide any other form of legal assistance for the purpose of:
(a) [s]ecuring or funding any item, benefit, program, or service furnished for the purpose
of causing, or the purpose of assisting in causing, the suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing
of any individual; (b) [c]ompelling any person, institution, or governmental entity to
provide or fund any item, benefit, program, or service for such purpose; or (c) [a]sserting
or advocating a legal right to cause, or to assist in causing, the suicide, euthanasia, or
mercy killing of any individual").
29. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 504(a)(16) (No funds are to be used by grantees to
"initiate[ ] legal representation, or participate[ ] in any other way, in litigation, lobbying,
or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system").
30. See David E. Rovella, Legal Aid Lawyers Roll Dice with New Lawsuit, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A6.
31. See id.
32. See Testimony of Edwin Meese III, Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative law of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.), February 28, 2002 ("Another example of the
LSC's Orwellian interpretation of its own restrictions involves Congress's prohibition of
any LSC funds going to any individual or group that 'initiates or participates in a class
action.' Despite this clear prohibition against class-action litigation, LSC grantees have
filed class action suits in Georgia and California and LSC has taken no action to stop
them. In dismissing complaints from Members of Congress and watchdog organizations,
[Vol. I110: 1
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In response to the call by many in the legal community to challenge
the 1996 Restrictions in court, several legal services advocates litigated
Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,33 which was ultimately decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001. In the action, Carmen Velazquez, a
grandmother living in the Bronx, challenged the 1996 OCRAA and its
restrictions. 34 Specifically, Velazquez sought a preliminary injunction on
the ground that the 1996 Restrictions limited her freedom of speech. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the prohibition on challenges to existing
law was unconstitutional because it impermissibly discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint by disfavoring those who opposed the status quo.
35
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that the 1996
Restrictions distorted the judicial system by altering the traditional role
of the attorneys and by "prohibit[ing] speech and expression upon which
courts must depend for proper exercise of the judicial power., 36 The
U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, struck the portion of the 1996
Restrictions concerning challenges by legal services attorneys to existing
welfare law. The Court concluded that the 1996 Restrictions prohibited
the lawyer from answering and, therefore, violated the First Amendment
rights of clients utilizing LSC-funded organizations. Despite the
Velazquez decision and other more recent decisions that limit the breadth
of the 1996 Restrictions, the class action restriction remains.37
III. The Class Action as a Legal Device
The class action evolved as an equitable device for joining
numerous litigants with similar claims where joinder was not otherwise
legally possible.38 In the English courts, compliance with compulsory
joinder rules often frustrated litigants and forced the separation of cases
LSC maintained that the California action was not a class action but a 'representative
action' and, as such, did not fall under the congressional restrictions. As this
Subcommittee knows, 'representative actions' are the functional equivalent of class
actions in several states. Indeed, both Black's Law Dictionary and Ballentine's Law
Dictionary agree that 'representative action' and 'class action' are interchangeable terms.
Apparently, Bill Clinton's artful definitions live on in the LSC Board members he
appointed.")
33. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
34. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) (No. 99-603 & No. 99-960).
35. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546.
36. See id. at 545.
37. See infra Part IV-B.
38. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940); see generally HERBERT B.
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, CLASS ACTIONS, (3d ed., McGraw-Hill 1992) (1977)
[hereinafter NEWBERG & CONTE]. For an excellent history of the class action device, see
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION (Yale University Press, 1987) [hereinafter YEAZELL].
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even when consolidation would have allowed for a better administration
of justice.39 In the American legal system, the class action serves
multiple purposes. One purpose of the class action is to allow for more
efficient caseload management by the courts by avoiding a multiplicity
of lawsuits that concern one legal issue and set of facts. 40 Towards that
end, the class action effects the "protection of the defendant from
inconsistent obligations ... [and] the provision of a convenient and
economical means of disposing of similar lawsuits. 'A1
A. Legal and Social Benefits of the Class Action Device
Class actions create better access to the courts.42 The class action
device accomplishes this ideal by allowing individuals to bring similar
claims as a group, often in cases where the litigants would have been
unable to bring their claims individually.43 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize a class action in cases where common issues
predominate within a class and where the class action is a superior
adjudicating mechanism when compared to other procedures. 44 The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that the drafters of the Federal Rule
authorizing the increased use of class actions were considering "the
rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.
45
In the past, the class action device has been used effectively to
enforce the rights and claims of the poor.46 In the context of the disabled
39. See YEAZELL, supra note 38, at 4.
40. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550-51 (1974) (describing
the class action as a legal tool of convenience and economy).
41. U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,402-03 (1980).
42. See Failinger & May, Litigating Against Poverty, supra note 4, at 17 (asserting
that "group representation devices such as class actions are often the most effective way
of representing an individual poor person.... The individual lawsuit... cannot remedy
past and future harassment or restore the political balance of power between the
institution and the individual. By contrast, the class suit can secure relief for the client
that is not only longer-lasting but also broader-based"); William B. Rubenstein, The
Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1865, 1881 (2002) ("Rules
enabling liberal party joinder and representative litigation have equalizing consequences
because these rules essentially allow parties to pool resources in prosecution of a
common claim"); see generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead.
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974) (arguing that
class actions remedy some of the disadvantages faced by poor litigants).
43. See Eisen v. Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding
the class action to be "one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those
who command the status quo").
44. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
45. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997), citing generally
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1967).
46. See Barbara Rabinowitz, Servicing the Poor, MASS. LAWYERS WKLY., May 10,
[Vol. I110: 1
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poor, the ability of LSC-funded legal services providers to litigate class
actions is especially important because the disabled are often unable to
assert their legal rights individually. As one commentator asserted,
"[w]hen the plaintiff is poor, marginalized, legally incompetent, ignorant
of legal rights, or unable to assert rights for fear of sanctions or
otherwise, and these disabilities are shared by others similarly situated,
the class action may be the only effective means to obtain judicial
relief.
, 47
Poor children have also benefited from class action lawsuits filed on
their collective behalf. For example, Gordon Bonnyman, Managing
Attorney at the Tennessee Justice Center, noted how a class action filed
on behalf of children who were also Medicaid recipients forced the
reform of thie state's administration of medical services to the poor.48 A
similar class action forced the Tennessee welfare program to institute
quality control devices that diminished the number of poor families that
lost their state welfare benefits by fifty percent.49 Mr. Bonnyman
concluded that "it was the combination of class action litigation,
sophisticated legislative and administrative advocacy, and close
collaboration with community groups, that made possible these
important gains for [his] clients. 50
Class actions also enable claims that may be economically and
socially insignificant as individual claims, but that are far more
significant as a whole, to be heard. For example, in the early 1980s,
many patients of New York City hospitals became homeless after they
were discharged pursuant to a new state policy.5 I The class action filed
on behalf of these patients was likely the only way that any of these
potential plaintiffs could have challenged the state rule. Viewed in
isolation, each poor patient's claim may not have been valuable enough,
1993, at 29 (discussing the ability of Boston's LSC legal services programs to use class
actions to attain benefits for the poor); William J. Dean, Success Story, 5/29/93 N.Y.L.J.
3 (noting the use of class actions to aid the homeless); Lynn Pierce, Trend and
Development: Raising the Roof on Community Housing for People with Disabilities, 6
APPEAL 22 (2000) [hereinafter Pierce, Trend and Development]; and Gordon Bonnyman,
Adapting Without Accepting: The Need for a Long-Term Strategy for "Full Service"
Representation of the Poor, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 435, 437 (1998) [hereinafter
Bonnyman, Adapting Without Accepting] (asserting that "we cannot forget why it is that
the particular advocacy activities that Congress prohibited remain so indispensable to the
poor").
47. Pierce, Trend and Development, supra note 46.
48. Bonnyman, Adapting Without Accepting, supra note 46, at 437.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Pierce, Trend and Development, supra note 46 (explaining that the patients were
made homeless due to the state policy of "least restrictive, community care") (also citing
New York Lawsuit for More Community Services is Justiciable, 8 MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW REPORTER 388 (1984)).
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either economically or socially, to merit a full-blown lawsuit; however,
as a class, all of the patients affected by the policy were able to bring
forth their legitimate claims. Similarly, class actions have aided the
ability of the homeless to force the government to provide housing.
52
Regardless of whether such lawsuits are successful, offering the poor
access to the courts through the use of class actions represents an
important step in creating equal treatment under the law.
Class action lawsuits enable even the unaware to be joined in
lawsuits instituted on their behalf. For example, prior to the victory of a
class action against the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare recipients were
often denied reimbursement from Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs") without any sort of administrative hearing or appeals
process.13 The class action suit challenging this practice was originally
brought on behalf of a few indigent women in Arizona who had been
denied necessary medical care without written notice or notice of an
appeals process. 4 The plaintiffs joined in the class action were all those
who had been enrolled in the Medicare-associated HMOs and who either
had been denied services without notice or without knowledge of the
right to appeal.55 Thus, the class representation served the interests of all
Medicare recipients, even though many beneficiaries of the class action
did not realize that they had been denied entitlements. Further, the
plaintiffs, arguing that "the Constitution requires an expedited hearing
before an HMO can deny services and that HMOs carry the burden of
proof for Medicare denials, 56 succeeded in convincing a federal district
court to fimd due process violations under the current Medicare
reimbursement system.57 As a result, the class action forced the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to provide quicker
reimbursement notices to all Medicare beneficiaries.58
Class action lawsuits also eliminate power imbalances by allowing a
class of underrepresented people with similar claims to attract more
effectively the attention of a powerful defendant. As a result of the
52. See Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 387, 399 (1991) [hereinafter Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy]
(discussing LSC local services providers that have used class actions to require
government housing for the homeless).
53. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998); vacated, 526 U.S. 1096
(1999), and remanded 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998) (remanded based on U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) and passage of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 275-330).
54. See Grijalva, 152 F.3dat 1117.
55. See id.
56. Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 750 (D. Ariz. 1996).
57. Id. at 757-59.
58. Grijalva, 152 F.3dat 1119.
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magnitude of the potential liability in class actions, defendants are forced
to treat them more seriously. The possibility of a class action lawsuit's
success may force a potential defendant to devote closer attention to the
issue that is the subject of the collective claim.
The class action lawsuit, thus, can be viewed as a tool that requires
potential defendants to internalize the costs of socially injurious policies.
For example, in Robinson v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co.,59 John H.
Robinson, the lead plaintiff for the class, asserted that his employer had
disproportionately underpaid wages and benefits to hundreds of African-
American employees.6° In bringing the lawsuit as a class action,
Robinson forced the Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Company to defend
itself against a single claim that could result in damages owed to many
plaintiffs. Ultimately, the class of over seven hundred employees
obtained damage payments exceeding $13.5 million from the company.6'
Without the availability of the class action device, it is doubtful that Mr.
Robinson and the other affected parties would have been able to force the
company to address its alleged wrongdoing. In this case, the class action
allowed an otherwise unprotected class of persons to force a large
company to pay for the social and economic harms that it caused.
Furthermore, class action lawsuits draw public attention to issues
that are unique to the poor community.62 Such increased public
awareness may provide the impetus for necessary political, legal, and
social reforms.6 3 A good illustration of the impact of a class action
lawsuit on public awareness can be found in a suit brought by the poor
living in Philadelphia public housing, who claimed that the city
government had prevented the construction of a new public housing
development based on racial concerns. The suit charged that the city
government had reached its housing decision based on local municipal
officials' reluctance to place African-American public housing residents
in a predominantly white neighborhood. 64 The class action's public
nature aided the successful construction of the highly-integrated public
housing development.
Last, the mere possibility of a class action lawsuit may encourage a
government or private agency to change its behavior without engaging in
59. 771 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
60. Id. at 1205.
61. See JoAnne Dellaverson, Recent Developments under Title VII and Section 1981,
as Amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 527 PLYLIT 249, 261 (1995) [hereinafter
Dellaverson, Recent Developments].
62. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 38.
63. See id. at 31, 35.
64. See Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice,
at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheet_classact.html (May 10, 2000).
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litigation.65 An example of such an expedited form of relief occurred
when the federal government stopped granting Supplemental Security
Income to 150,000 Philadelphia children a decade ago. It was also
reported that federal government officials pressured the affected
children's families not to appeal the cessation of benefits.66 An LSC-
funded attorney in Philadelphia began preparation for a national class
action. Within three months of the attorney's notice to the Social
Security Commissioner of the potential suit, a change in policy was
made. The federal government granted the children and their families,
who were originally discouraged from fighting the denial of benefits,
67another appeals opportunity.
B. Drawbacks to the Class Action Device
Despite its many benefits, the class action lawsuit is not a flawless
mechanism for advancing the claims of the poor. A class action is an all-
or-nothing venture that can extinguish any potential future claims for
members of the class. This heightened risk, inherent in all class actions,
may outweigh potential client benefits.
Unlike an individual lawsuit, in a class action, the interests of the
class come before the interests of individual class members.
68
Individuals may find that group litigation will not address their needs for
justice appropriately. Class actions are almost always unable to tailor the
pace of the litigation to individual class members. Time delay can be a
huge obstacle in class actions, where defendants can utilize a broad range
of unique delay tactics. 69 Mr. Robinson and his class, for example, were
only able to collect their $13.5 million in damages after more thanfifteen
years of litigation. 70 Whether LSC-funded attorneys should engage in
lengthy class action litigation, as opposed to seeking quicker solutions
that more closely meet the needs of individual clients, is certainly a
question that should be considered.
The decreased focus on individual clients that occurs in many class
actions was a motivating factor for Congress when it enacted the class
action restriction. The legislative history indicates that Senators
supporting the 1996 legislation believed the class action ban would
"refocus LSC on its primary mission, which is to provide basic legal




68. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 38, at 35-36.
69. See id. at 41-42.
70. See Dellaverson, Recent Developments, supra note 61, at 261.
71. S. REP. No. 104-392, at 1 (1996).
[Vol. I110: 1
DISMISSING THE CLASS
especially among opponents of the LSC, that legal services lawyers were
"hijacking" cases in order to achieve desired legal reform goals based on
their own political desires.72 Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana
testified that LSC-funded lawyers "[have] routinely been involved in
controversial class action suits and other litigation that promotes [sic] a
radical agenda., 73  Other critics accused legal services lawyers of
"having strayed into a liberal political activism, neglecting the provision
of legal aid to the indigent., 74 These comments are representative of the
arguments that were offered in support of the class action restriction.7 5
Most of the class actions filed on behalf of the poor, however, have
attempted only to force government and private agencies to follow
current law. Injunctive relief, and not actual monetary damages, is
usually the remedy sought by attorneys representing the poor.76 On the
other hand, multiple plaintiffs filing individual suits that indicate a
common source of harms could force defendants to respond just as
quickly as they would to a class action. Legal services lawyers
nevertheless have argued that class actions are a device that levels the
litigation playing field between the poor and paying clients.77  As
Professor William P. Quigley laments, "Congress has decided that legal
aid alone and not legal aid and law reform will be available to the poor.
As a consequence, poor people's lawyers will not be allowed access to
all the tools available to the lawyers for the rest of the population.,
78
The question of whether class action lawsuits bolster the legal
representation of the poor or, alternatively, propel the political and social
agenda of legal services lawyers, remains. If the class action device
72. See Dan Burton, Congressional Testimony before the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary, 1996 WL 160917
(Mar. 29, 1996).
73. Id.
74. Tom Jackson, Legal Aid Staff Waits to See if Office Will Survive, THE SUNDAY
CONST. (Lawton, Okla.), Aug. 3, 1997.
75. See id. at pt. 2 (Rep. William McCollum also testified that "we have seen
extensive abuses within the LSC by lawyers with their own political agendas actively
recruiting clients, creating claims, and advancing their own social causes").
76. See Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice,
at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheetclassact.html (May 10, 2000).
77. See, e.g., Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid,
supra note 5; Legal Services 1996 Annual Report: Legal Services in Congress in 1996
(the class action ban was "imposed despite the fact that class-action litigation, along with
other kinds of advocacy, have 'always been recognized as important tools for attorneys to
employ on behalf of their clients"').
78. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid, supra note 5,
at 264. In fact, Mr. Quigley was so incensed that he decided to run for a Louisiana
Supreme Court seat largely based on certain 1996 Restrictions. Mark Schleifstein,
Foster, Clinics Face Off on Rules, Legal Debate Goes Beyond Shintech, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PISCAYUNE, Aug. 2, 1998, at Al.
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causes a legal services lawyer to substitute his own policy objectives for
the individual needs of the class members, use of this device could be
challenged on ethical grounds. Such conflicts inevitably arise. For
example, a regulatory agency's admission of liability in a settlement
agreement in exchange for lower monetary damages might be appealing
to some legal services lawyers, whereas the affected class might prefer
higher damages even in the absence of such an admission. Assuming
that the interests of the class remain the priority of the legal services
lawyer, however, it would be difficult to argue that the class action
lawsuit, in and of itself, is objectionable.
Despite their benefits, class action lawsuits still present a legal
services lawyer with extreme challenges.7 9  Besides the practical
implications of addressing the needs of many persons, there are almost
always large costs, both economic and otherwise, associated with
litigating class actions. The value of the class action lawsuit should be
evaluated in terms of opportunity cost because by allocating resources to
a class action, a legal services provider is necessarily diverting assistance
from individual clients. Unlike a regular lawsuit, representation of a
class requires public notice through local newspapers or personalized
notices, 80 both of which are expensive.81 Class actions also require
significantly more labor than individual claims require. It is possible
that individual clients could be given more immediate relief if legal
service providers allocated the time and money required in a class action
to these individuals. Class actions also may face a harsh reception in
court, depending on whether the judge agrees with the critical views of
LSC-funded class actions discussed above.
83
It is reasonable to question whether class actions would be the best
use of LSC funds. Some commentators contend that class actions as a
legal advocacy tool may be ineffectual, as they represent "slow, god-
awful, very ineffective, bull-in-a-china-shop kinds of efforts." 84 These
commentators claim that proponents of LSC-funded class actions often
overlook potential costs. For example, legal services lawyer Gordon
Bonnyman has extolled the benefits of class actions in commentary
regarding the 1996 Restrictions.85 While he comments that prior to the
79. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 38, at 35-39.
80. FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 23.
81. Id.
82. See Bruce A. Green & Martha Matthews, Report of the Working Group on
Rendering Legal Assistance to Similarly Situated Individuals, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1801,
1805 (1999).
83. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 38, at 38, 48-51.
84. Robert Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 79, 87 (1987) [hereinafter Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor].
85. Bonnyman, Adapting Without Accepting, supra note 46. See supra Part III.
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1996 Restrictions, a colleague of his won a "55-page class action
settlement that will reform Medicaid managed care services for a half
million poor children in Tennessee," 86 he does not mention that this
settlement took years to achieve. Bonnyman also neglects to explore any
alternatives to class actions as viable means of seeking redress. In the
absence of a more balanced view of class actions as a legal device, it is
not surprising that some critics have concluded that such efforts for the
poor "may, by choice or necessity, implement social policies that do not
properly address the causes of the problem they confront.,
87
IV. Assessment of the Class Action Restriction
A. The Social Impact
The claim that the class action restriction has actually improved the
delivery of legal services to the poor ignores the obvious social impact of
the restriction. The 1996 Restriction regarding class actions prevents
clients from bringing legitimate claims, causes inefficiency within local
legal service centers, and hinders effective change in bureaucratic and
regulatory policy.
According to the LSC annual report delivered to Congress for fiscal
years 1997 and 1998, the class action restriction caused legal services
lawyers to resign from over 600 cases involving more than four hundred
thousand clients.88 Although these numbers alone do not indicate any
social harm, in many of these cases, no other lawyer took the helm of the
already formed class action after the legal services lawyers were forced
to resign.89 Also, according to David Udell, Director of the Brennan
Center for Justice, "[f]or every class action case that Legal Services
86. Bonnyman, Adapting Without Accepting, supra note 46, at 437.
87. Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, supra note 52, at 398.
88. In addition, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law has conducted
extensive studies regarding the impact of the class action restriction on the representation
of the poor. According to its 2000 study, the class action restriction has resulted in a
significant drop in class action lawsuits filed by recipients of LSC funds. See Brennan
Center for Justice, Restricting Legal Services: How Congress left the Poor with Only Half
a Lawyer, at http://brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj2.pdf (2000); Brennan Center for
Justice, Left Out in the Cold: How Clients are Affected by Restrictions on their Legal
Services Lawyers, at http://brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj6.pdf (2000); and Brennan
Center for Justice, Bearing Witness: Legal Services Clients Tell Their Stories, at
http://brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj5.pdf (2000).
89. See Brennan Center for Justice, Restricting Legal Services: How Congress left
the Poor with Only Half a Lawyer, at http://brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj2.pdf
(2000); Brennan Center for Justice, Left Out in the Cold: How Clients are Affected by
Restrictions on their Legal Services Lawyers, at http://brennancenter.org/resources/
atj/atj6.pdf (2000); and Brennan Center for Justice, Bearing Witness: Legal Services
Clients Tell Their Stories, at http://brennancenter.org/resources/atj/atj5.pdf (2000).
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programs abandoned, there are countless others that they will never take,
depriving thousands of potential clients of the representation they
otherwise could expect from Legal Services lawyers." 90
The fact that the class action restriction has caused legal services
lawyers to resign from or refuse to participate in cases involving the poor
community has caused social harm. In New York City, for example,
lawyers working for MFY Legal Services met with over a dozen
mentally ill, indigent individuals who have not been able to obtain
reduced-fare "Metro Cards" to use the city subway system.9' David F.
Dobbins, a private attorney working for a corporate law firm in New
York, volunteered at MFY Legal Services for years. He was prepared to
file suit and rely on a state law requiring the Metro Transit Authority to
offer reduced-fare Metro Cards to people suffering from serious mental
illness who were eligible for federal Supplemental Security Income
disability benefits. 92  Mr. Dobbins determined that "adequate
representation of his indigent clients require[d] him to file a class action
to assure that the legal challenge to MTA policy [was] not mooted by
granting relief to an individual litigant., 93 In light of the class action
restriction, Mr. Dobbins considered severing his ties with MFY Legal
Services and bringing the reduced-fare litigation as a private individual.94
Mr. Dobbins stated, however, that it would be "both unwise and
professionally inappropriate to seek to be the sole legal representative for
a class of indigent mentally disabled persons with whom [he had] an
extremely limited relationship, and about whom [his] knowledge [was]
extremely limited." 95 Consequently, the reduced-fare class action, and
its potential participants, has not made its way into court. In December
2001, however, Mr. Dobbins did file a claim challenging the
constitutionality of the class action restriction.96
It is possible to argue that Mr. Dobbins and MFY Legal Services
overstated the need to bring a class action lawsuit. A myriad of
alternatives to litigation could have enabled MFY Legal Services and
pro bono volunteers to pressure the Metro Transit Authority to grant the
mentally ill reduced-fare Metro Cards. MFY Legal Services could have
filed multiple suits against the agency on behalf of individual plaintiffs.
90. David S. Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle for Other
Government Grants for Lawyeringfor the Poor, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 895, 906 (1998)
[hereinafter Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle].
91. See Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice,





96. Velazquez v. Legal Serv. Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Indeed, such a barrage of suits could have pressured the large agency,
facing its own time and budgetary constraints, to alter its policy. The
increased use of standard pleading forms from electronic templates could
have made such an alternative preferable to the complex compliance
procedures of class actions.
Mr. Dobbins, however, responded that as a litigator from a large
corporate law firm, his expertise was largely focused on class action
lawsuits.97 In this case, the class action restriction had a drastic impact
on Mr. Dobbins' ability to represent the poor on a pro bono basis, as his
volunteer schedule made it impossible for him to represent every
mentally ill client seeking a half-fare Metro Card. Without this
restriction, Mr. Dobbins, with his years of corporate litigation
experience, might have been able to provide relief to hundreds of MFY
Legal Services clients.
Another striking example of the restriction's negative social impact
is apparent in attempts by South Brooklyn Legal Services to provide
relief to low-income workers operating day care centers in
underprivileged neighborhoods throughout the city.98 According to the
Center's director, John C. Gray, these workers were shortchanged
payments owed to them by New York City as a result of an incorrect
reimbursement formula.99 When the class action restriction was enacted
in 1996, Mr. Gray complained that South Brooklyn Legal Services was
forced to withdraw from the pending class action lawsuit against New
York City regarding the reimbursement. 100 Consequently, Mr. Gray
claimed that the legal services lawyers in his organization were only able
to obtain a twelve thousand dollar settlement for one of the women who
had been harmed by the faulty reimbursement formula. 1° 1 According to
Mr. Gray, the delay tactics inherent in any lawsuit cause the process of
obtaining multiple settlements for hundreds of plaintiffs to be relatively
slow.
The inability of local legal services programs to organize class
action lawsuits can result in the inefficient use of legal services
resources, and thus, of LSC funds. While class actions enable legal
services lawyers to bring one case that can help many members of a
community, the class action restriction causes legal services lawyers to
duplicate work for many clients seeking redress from the same party for
97. See Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice,
at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheetclassact.html (May 10, 2000).
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the same harm. 102 According to a director of a legal services center,
"when clients are unable to proceed in a class action, they must instead
pursue their claims individually, burdening the resources of the legal
services program and those of the courts."'
0 3
The lack of a class action option may also result in the provision of
inconsistent legal services to clients who possess similar legal claims. If
multiple clients seek redress for the same harm, such as the refusal to
grant half-fare Metro Cards to the mentally ill, different staff members
working on the cases at local legal services programs may give different
advice. Some clients may be told to file an appeal with a regulatory
agency, while others may be assisted in bringing actual lawsuits. If these
clients could bring their claims together as a class, the possibility of
inconsistent treatment would decrease dramatically.
The autonomy of local legal services programs has been
significantly diminished by the class action restriction. The purpose of
decentralized service is to increase the ability of local legal services
providers to specialize in their community's needs. For example, the
potential half-fare Metro Card class action lawsuit would enable local
legal services programs in New York City to help mentally-ill clients as a
group, rather than dealing with individual claims. It is unlikely that this
suit would have been brought by politically motivated legal services
lawyers merely to champion "liberal ideals."'
10 4
The class action restriction enables regulatory agencies to act
without an important check on their power to interpret and apply the law
appropriately. While class actions can compel government bureaucracies
to follow the law, the class action restriction effectively removes the
threat of public claims by large groups of concerned citizens. According
to Maryland Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, who often defends the
state against class action lawsuits, "Government is not infallible. As
uncomfortable and irritating as it may be, sometimes it is class-actions by
[LSC-funded] lawyers that require the state to do what it is legally bound
102. In a 1999 conference on the class action restriction and other restrictions on the
LSC, participants argued that the class action restriction is inefficient in that it requires
legal services lawyers to duplicate litigation regarding common harms. See
Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income
Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1751, 1752-53 (1999) [hereinafter Recommendations of
the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons] ("When court
calendars are clogged with numerous cases involving the same issue because court and
counsel are barred from using the class action mechanism to resolve the issue, resolution
of the cases of other litigants is delayed. This makes the judicial system less efficient and
reduces public confidence in, and support for, the judicial system.").





to do.",10 5 The restriction against class action lawsuits, therefore, has
inhibited the change of regulatory agency policies that adversely affect
the poor.
The class action ban also has prevented actors outside of a
regulatory agency from reviewing that agency's relevant policies. Prior
to the class action restriction, legal services lawyers instituted class
actions in order to force judicial review of agency policies. In
Philadelphia, for example, the city deemed children age four and older
ineligible for any benefits from the "Women, Infants and Children"
program, which offers food to poor children. 10 6 As a result of a class
action lawsuit instituted on behalf of those children, legal services
lawyers obtained not only a ruling from a judge that the city's policy was
unconstitutional, but also a new requirement that the responsible city
agency devise fair hearing regulations, ensuring that other children
would not go without food in the future due to "the bureaucratic rules of
the game."'
10 7
It should be recognized that individual and multi-plaintiff lawsuits
also play a role in achieving changes in government policy. A landmark
judicial decision regarding an individual plaintiff has often paved the
way for the fundamental changes for which progressive lawyers have
fought for years. The class action lawsuit, therefore, should be viewed
not as a panacea, but rather as one of many legal devices that should be
available to the poor.
B. The Legal Impact
The 1996 Restrictions, including the class action restriction, may
impinge upon legal services clients' constitutional right of access to the
courts.10 8  Although the poor generally are not a protected class of
individuals in the eyes of the courts, heightened scrutiny is appropriate
for a statute or regulation that "tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
105. Elisabeth Jacobs, LSC Restriction Fact Sheet #1, Brennan Center for Justice, at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/factsheetclassact.html (May 10, 2000).
106. For a thorough discussion of this litigation, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The
Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 659, 675-78 (1987) [hereinafter Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law
and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment].
107. Id. at 688 n.172.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging.., the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances."); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (finding that "the right to file
a court action stands, in the words of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), as
his most 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."') (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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minorities." 10 9 In other words, if the rights to be exercised by the poor
are necessary in order to ensure that the government does not
disenfranchise the poor without the availability of redress, then those
rights should be strongly protected." 0 Access to the courts is a powerful
device with which the poor, a weak political class, can find redress."'
The effect of the class action restriction, therefore, can be viewed as
"denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs
which substantially affect their lives."
' 12
The class action restriction admittedly does not prevent poor clients
from bringing class actions; instead, it forces them to bring class action
lawsuits through private lawyers or legal aid services that do not receive
LSC funds. Effective legal representation requires access to a "full range
of quality legal services," including class actions." 3 Providing the poor
with "access" to the courts without the full range of legal tools available
"may make lawyers feel good about themselves and the legal system,
but, like a medical facility that dispenses only aspirin, this type of
program is of little societal value." ' 1 4 Without the availability of the
class action to LSC-funded lawyers, the number of class actions brought
on behalf of the poor also has diminished significantly. 15 This decrease
indicates that the poor are no longer receiving the array of legal services
that was available to them before the class action restriction took effect.
Additionally, it is probable that those class actions brought by
private lawyers have been weakened by the lack of collaboration with
LSC-funded legal services programs and their resources. 1 6  One
commentator has noted that "the staff-attorney system [of LSC-
associated legal services programs] provides a cadre of lawyers who are
109. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
110. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating
a poll tax because the right to vote may not be conditioned on wealth); Lubin v. Panish,
415 709 (1974) (invalidating an campaign filing fee because the right to run for office
may not be conditioned on wealth).
111. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 600 (1994) [hereinafter Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services
to Ordinary Americans] ("Winning the battle in the courts rather than in the legislatures
does not violate democratic principles because the courts are intervening on behalf of
groups that are under-represented in the legislatures.").
112. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
113. See Allen Redlich, A New Legal Services Agenda, 57 ALB. L. REv. 169, 174
(1993).
114. Id. at 175.
115. See supra note 88.
116. See Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, supra note 111.
According to Professor Cramton, the delivery of legal services could be organized "so
that clients are served by experienced specialists in various areas of poverty law, such as
welfare, housing, or education". Id. at 590.
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intellectually and personally committed to serving the poor.",
17
Although privately-funded legal aid organizations and LSC-funded legal
services centers have not often collaborated in the past, perhaps a
successful use of the class action tool would encourage such joint efforts.
It would seem sensible to conclude, therefore, that forcing privately-
supported legal aid lawyers to bring class actions effectively prevents
them from employing the expertise of the LSC-associated legal services
lawyers in a meaningful way.
The burdens on poor litigants are further increased by the federal
government's right to re-litigate issues already decided in similar
cases.118 The inapplicability of the offensive collateral estoppel doctrine
in cases against the government means that individual plaintiffs are
unable to rely on case precedent unfavorable to the government. The
federal government, meanwhile, may re-litigate a decided-upon matter
again and again. For the poor, the inability to rely on already litigated
cases makes the burden to bring forth individual suits even greater. In
the class action context, the pursuit of a class action on behalf of an
entire class of individuals may only result in a single instance of
litigation. Conversely, without the availability of the class action, the
cost of re-litigating an issue on multiple occasions is passed on to each
individual litigant, resulting in large individual costs as well as uncertain
case outcomes. The class action restriction thus constitutes an extreme
burden on poor litigants. It is quite possible, then, that the class action
restriction is impermissible restriction on a poor citizen's fundamental
right of access to the courts.
The argument also can be made that the restriction
unconstitutionally impairs the "judicial function," thereby violating the
separation of powers mandated by the Constitution. In Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez," 9 the Court held that certain 1996 Restrictions
(other than the class action restriction) violated the separation of powers
between the branches of government. 20 The Court noted that certain
restrictions would result in "lingering doubt whether the truncated
representation had resulted in complete analysis of the case, full advice
to the client, and proper presentation of the case.",12' As the judiciary is
typically the branch that determines whether lawsuits ought to be
litigated individually or as a class, this sort of "truncated representation"
may occur as a result of the class action restriction. Judges are now
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984) (finding offensive
collateral estoppel inapplicable against the government).
119. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
120. Id. at 546.
121. Id.
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preempted from making these decisions in cases involving poor classes
because clients with LSC-fumded legal services lawyers are forced to
present all cases individually without ever making judges aware of the
need for a class action. Congress has effectively wrested control of case
management away from judges.
The class action restriction also affects judicial efficiency, as the
blanket ban ensures that LSC-funded legal services programs will not
bring class actions, even when they would be the most efficient form of
litigation. Thus, already clogged courts are additionally burdened when
claims based on a common issue must be litigated individually in order
for each member of the class to obtain relief.
The class action restriction also may burden a private donor's First
Amendment speech rights. 122 Private donors often contribute funds to
legal services organizations. Private funds flow to legal services centers
because donors desire to support certain speech (i.e., the representation
of the poor and the promotion of issues important to the poor). It is
unclear whether legal services programs should be considered public
fora, like sidewalks or public parks, for speech purposes because they
have mixed characteristics. For example, legal services programs
receive federal money to provide representational conduct, but the legal
services programs themselves may not be considered open to the public
for expressive activity. 123 It is similarly unclear whether the class action
restriction is a speech restriction that should be considered viewpoint
neutral in nature.
As a result of the lack of clarity regarding the nature of the speech
forum and the nature of the restriction itself, it is also unclear how
significant the government interest would need to be in order to limit
such speech justifiably. If legal services programs were found to be
public fora or if the class action restriction were determined not to be
viewpoint neutral, then the government would have to justify the
restrictions with a compelling state interest. 124 The asserted government
interest in this case is refocusing LSC-funded services on individual poor
clients rather than on class interests.125 It is unclear that a complete ban
could, however, be justified based on this interest, even if it were
122. See Ilisabeth Smith Bornstein, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of
the Constitutionality of the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services
Attorneys, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693 (2003), in which the author argues that the class
action restriction is unconstitutional because it imposes viewpoint discrimination.
123. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (determining that public property may become a public forum if the state
designates it as such, even it traditionally had not been considered to be a public forum).
124. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).




compelling. Such speech regulations usually must be narrowly tailored
to avoid burdening speech any more than necessary to serve the
governmental interest.
26
Even if the legal services programs are not public fora, the
government normally must demonstrate that it has a rational interest that
outweighs the burden placed upon the speaker.127 Typically, this entails
demonstrating that the regulation is reasonable and not aimed at
suppressing certain viewpoints. 28 Although the regulation has a rational
interest of serving individual clients rather than the whole class, an
argument could be made that the class action restriction is geared
towards suppressing the viewpoints of the poor. If only the poor are
going to be affected by the decrease in class action lawsuits brought as a
result of the increased compliance costs of the restriction, then it is
possible that this restriction is viewpoint-based. This is especially true
given the political motivation underlying the enactment of the 1996
Restrictions.
29
Nevertheless, the lone case in which the 1996 Restrictions on class
actions were found to be unconstitutional was Varshavsky v. Perales.
130
In that case, the court found that the First Amendment right "of LSC
lawyers, their clients and anyone who agrees with them" was burdened
by the restrictions. 131 Further, the federal government's asserted interest
was not deemed compelling enough to justify the restrictions. The court
was particularly troubled by the politically-charged nature of the
government's interest in enacting the restrictions. It noted that Senator
Phil Gramm had stated that "these restrictions will ensure that scarce
resources available for this purpose are not diverted to costly class action
or impact litigation, or to activities which promote a particular political
agenda."' 132 The court also noted that Congressman Robert Doman had
asserted "[i]t's time to defund the left." The court concluded that the
class action restriction was unconstitutional, as "the legislation weakens
the ability of poor people to stand up for their legal rights and to have an
impact, when it may be their only effective method to petition the
126. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
127. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(finding it reasonable for the government to exclude certain political advocacy groups
from a charity drive in order to serve the government interest of minimizing workplace
disruption); cf. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
(finding that the government's interest in keeping an airport terminal clear of pedestrians
was not sufficient to ban leafletters).
128. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
129. See supra Part III for further discussion.
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government for redress of grievances."1
33
The limitations of Varshavsky, however, are clear. The case was
only decided at the state trial level, and other courts have relied upon it
for the proposition that other 1996 Restrictions burdening speech are
unconstitutional.1 34  The judge's decision to find the restrictions
unconstitutional did not reach the situation where the restriction applies
only to the use of federal funds. Further, the decision appears to be
limited to finding that the legal services lawyer in that particular case,
who was seeking to continue her representation of the class, would be
allowed to do so. The relevance of Varshavsky, therefore, was limited in
terms of addressing the constitutional questions that the class action
restriction posed. Additionally, and more importantly, the Velazquez
Court found the class action restriction to be facially valid, and a
subsequent federal decision discussed below declined to find
constitutional defects with the restriction.'35
As was discussed earlier, in December 2001, MFY Legal Services
lawyer David F. Dobbins filed a claim challenging the constitutionality
of the class action restriction.1 36  This suit was combined with the
ongoing Velazquez litigation.' 37 As might be expected, the plaintiff legal
services providers asserted that the class action restriction violated the
First Amendment.' 38 The plaintiffs also argued that the requirement of
maintaining separate programs for non-LSC-funded class actions was an
unconstitutional burden on LSC-funded legal services programs.
139
Although the court in this case issued a preliminary injunction severely
limiting the "physical separateness" requirements between LSC-funded
legal services providers and legal services providers that do not receive
LSC funds (so long as certain guidelines were followed), the court
declined to find that the class action restriction was unconstitutional.
40
Based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Velazquez, the court was
"constrained to reject plaintiffs' argument that the restriction [on class
133. Id.
134. See Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 768 (1999); Velazquez v.
Legal Services Corporation, 349 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), modified by 356 F.
Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v. LSC, 961 F.
Supp. 1402, 1410 (D. Haw. 1997) (finding that it "would be imprudent to
constitutionalize the civil rules of procedure" by recognizing a constitutional right to
bring class action lawsuits.").





140. Id. See also Brennan Center for Justice, at http://www.brennancenter.org/
programs/pov/dobbins/dobbins decisions.pdf (last visited May 17, 2005) for a
description of these guidelines.
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action lawsuits] is impermissibly viewpoint based because it distorts the
legal system."'141 The court ruled that the plaintiffs had not
"demonstrated how, under Rosenberger's formulation of viewpoint-
based regulation of speech, the restriction targets the 'specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.' 142 Because the
class action restriction was deemed to be viewpoint neutral, the only
constitutional requirement for the restriction was reasonableness, and the
court found that the justifications underlying the class action restriction
were reasonable. 1
43
C. The Professional Impact
In addition to the social and legal effects of the class action
restriction, the ethical and professional implications posed by the
restriction offer further reason to consider its legitimacy. Legal services
lawyers have questioned whether they can represent clients ethically in
accordance with the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and still comply with the class action restriction.
144
In certain cases that are otherwise permissible under the 1996
Restrictions, legal services attorneys may desire to proceed in a certain
strategic direction, but cannot follow their best legal judgment because of
the restriction.
This dilemma often arises when a legal services attorney represents
or advises an individual client involved in an action against a defendant
who is alleged to have harmed a large group of similarly situated
individuals. The legal services lawyer may believe that the best course
of action is to institute a class action lawsuit against the defendant.
According to several legal services lawyers, such ethical dilemmas often
arise when large regulatory agencies follow unconstitutional or
statutorily inconsistent policies that affect a large group of individuals.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995).
143. Id. (describing the justification for the class action restriction, including its belief
that the class action as an advocacy device was an inappropriate use of LSC funds and
that alternative private agencies existed for such advocacy).
144. See, e.g., Alan Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2187, 2188 (1999) [hereinafter Houseman, Restrictions by
Funders] (arguing that the 1996 Restrictions may "force attorneys into ethical dilemmas
that can only be resolved through resignation" and consequently, "[the] current
restrictions must be removed, and no further restrictions should be imposed."). See also
Samuel J. Levine, Legal Services Lawyers and the Influence of Third Parties on the
Lawyer-Client Relationship: Some Thoughts from Scholars, Practitioners, and Courts, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 2319 (1999); Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of
Legal Services to Low-Income Persons, supra note 102.
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Aside from harms potentially caused by government agencies, legal
services lawyers also face this situation when dealing with a significant
number of consumer claims, such as those directed towards a single large
company. In these cases, the only efficient means of proceeding may be
a class action lawsuit. If the legal services attorney works for an LSC-
funded organization, he may only assist the client as an individual and
may not attempt to organize a class. The question of whether he has
violated any of the Model Rules, however, still remains.
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that
lawyers must "provide competent representation" to all of their clients.
145
According to this Rule, if a lawyer knowingly fails to present a sound
legal issue to a client or to raise one in a legal proceeding, the lawyer has
violated his ethical obligation to his client. 146 It could be argued that if a
client's objectives and needs may only be satisfied through a class action
lawsuit, a lawyer would not be providing competent representation if he
did not suggest this route to his client.
Proponents of the 1996 Restrictions could contend, however, that
Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits a lawyer to
limit the scope of the representation if the client consents after
consultation. 147  Further, Rule 1.2 explicitly allows a legal services
lawyer to restrict the scope of his representation of a client in accordance
with legislative restrictions or agency regulations. 48 The Rule states,
however, that the legal services client must give his consent to the
limitation of representation. 49 In the absence of such consent, the legal
services lawyer would be forced to resign from representing the client.
Despite the claim that Rule 1.2 permits the class action restriction,
there are boundaries to the limitations on representation that a client may
accept. 50 According to commentary of the American Bar Association, a
client may not agree to surrender rights if doing so would cause his
representation not to accord with the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 15' For example, a client may not be permitted to surrender the
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) ("In determining whether a
lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors
include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation
and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the
matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner.
Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances").
146. See id.
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002).
148. See Houseman, Restrictions by Funders, supra note 144.
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002).




right to terminate his attorney's employment or the right to settle claim.
It is unclear, however, whether a client may permissibly surrender the
right to participate in certain types of litigation, such as class action
lawsuits.
The restrictions also may intrude upon other aspects of the lawyer-
client relationship in many class action cases. According to regulations
promulgated by the LSC, a grantee of LSC funding may engage in "non-
adversarial activities" with clients regarding class action litigation . 5 2 If
the legal services lawyer advising the client assists in any aspect of the
opposing counsel's case, however, he must withdraw from advising the
client immediately. Consequently, legal services lawyers who attempt to
stay within the boundaries of permissible conduct under LSC regulations
may risk providing counsel that is inadequate.
The class action restriction also poses a number of professional
problems to grantees of LSC funding. The class action restriction may
cause legal services centers to duplicate efforts by filing numerous
identical cases. The restriction explicitly requires that the grantees of
LSC funding establish a separate entity, with its own facility and own
staff. Separate records must also be kept.'53 As David Udell, Director of
the Brennan Center for Justice, suggests, however, segregating LSC
offices from non-LSC offices is a discouragingly inadequate solution, for
very few local legal services programs would be able to support multiple
centers with multiple staffs. 54 While several legal services programs,
such as Greater Boston Legal Services, have reallocated funds or simply
refused federal LSC funds, 55 it is not likely that small legal services
offices would make such budgetary changes simply to be able to bring
class action lawsuits.
V. Alternatives and Proposed Solutions
A. Revising the 1996 Restrictions
The first, and most obvious, alternative to the current legal regime is
to revise the class action restriction. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
struck down the provisions of the 1996 Restrictions prohibiting grantees
from challenging existing welfare laws, 156 Congress should consider pre-
empting further possible judicial intervention by removing the current
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(2) (1998).
153. See id.
154. Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle, supra note 90, at 920-21. But
see supra Part IV-B.
155. See Udell, Implications of the Legal Services Struggle, supra note 90, at 895 n.2.
156. See Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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class action restriction.
In light of the social, legal and professional harms posed by the
class action restriction, Congress should remove this portion of the
statute. The significant opposition to the use of LSC funds for class
action lawsuits, however, may prevent a complete overhaul of the current
statute. As Senator Domenici of New Mexico commented to the press
regarding his support of the 1996 Restrictions, "You have to eliminate
class actions if you expect the Senate to be supportive of this program. I
have to be able to stand up on the floor and say 'no more class
actions."" 57  Many commentators have argued that Congress
oversimplified the issues surrounding the class action lawsuit provision
in 1996 by passing draconian legislation.'58 As Senator Domenici
concluded, "Although I could live with only a partial restriction on class
actions, I think I have to give assurance that there are to be no more class
actions permitted."' 5 9
In place of the current class action restriction, new legislation could
provide that LSC-funded lawyers may participate in class action lawsuits
only with the consent of the executive director of the local legal services
office. This provision was the predecessor of the current class action
restriction. 60 Under such a provision, Congress would be assured that
legal services lawyers would be restrained from launching class action
lawsuits haphazardly. If proposed class actions were not given much
scrutiny by executive directors, however, then this provision would not
be a serious check on the institution of class actions by legal services
lawyers. To address this concern, Congress could also direct the LSC to
issue regulations prescribing factors that an executive director must
consider when approving or disapproving a potential class action lawsuit.
For example, these requirements could mandate that an executive
director or executive board may approve a class action only if:
1) the lawsuit would directly benefit current clients of the legal
services center;
2) the lawsuit would be the only means by which to acquire relief
from a regulatory or government agency;
3) the lawsuit would enable the legal services center to operate in a
more efficient manner; and
4) the lawsuit would otherwise respond to relevant Congressional
157. Alexander Forger, Address: The Future of Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 333, 335 (1998).
158. See id. Alexander Forger asserted that he "had the impression that many in
Congress literally believed that a class action meant the lower classes against the upper
classes." Id.
159. Id.




Any potential replacement of the current restriction could also
prohibit consideration of the potential monetary award from a class
action lawsuit.161 As a complete revocation of the current provision is
unlikely to win Congressional support, these supplemental requirements
could allay Congressional queries or fears.
Congress could also require the LSC to promulgate regulations
compelling grantees of federal funds to submit records regarding
involvement in class actions. The LSC, in turn, could require that every
grantee of its funds require any of its attorneys who participate in class
action lawsuits to submit an annual report to the LSC attesting to the
number of class action lawsuits in which he was involved. Such a
provision would enable the LSC and Congress to monitor any legal
services lawyer suspected of engaging in too many "political" class
action lawsuits. It could be argued, however, that such a provision
would enable Congressmen or LSC officials to "single out" specific
lawyers for pursuing what Congressman Dan Burton has described as a
"radical agenda."' 162 In response to this potential hazard, Congress might
add language establishing that a frequent number of class actions by a
single attorney does not necessarily establish a presumption that the
attorney was motivated by ideological rather than client considerations.
Such provisions would enable Congress to revoke the class action
restriction while retaining the ability to monitor LSC-funded class action
lawsuits.
Congress could also require that lawyers in particular legal services
centers could only participate in a certain number of class action lawsuits
per year. For example, such a provision might restrict lawyers'
participation to five class action lawsuits each year, or it could provide
that no more than a certain percentage of the lawyer's cases each year
could be class action lawsuits. A potential danger of this
recommendation, though, is that a legal services lawyer could face the
same ethical challenges when reaching his legislated limit as he did
before the revocation of the class action restriction. The limit on the total
161. It should be noted that most legal services organizations are already prohibited
from considering potential monetary awards from any lawsuit under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The Legal Services Corporation itself is
an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (1986) ("The Corporation, and any legal assistance
program assisted by the Corporation, shall be eligible to be treated as an organization
described in section 170(c)(2)(B) of Title 26 and as an organization described in section
501 (c)(3) of Title 26 which is exempt from taxation under section 501 (a) of Title 26.").
162. Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,
State and Judiciary of the House Appropriations Comm., 104th Cong. Pt. 9 at 129-30
(1996) (testimony of Rep. Dan Burton).
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number of class action lawsuits should be considered with great care.
Last, after revoking the class action restriction, Congress or the LSC
could require that an LSC-funded legal services center participate in a
class action lawsuit only if a specific number of potential class members
are clients of that legal services center. Such a requirement would ensure
that legal services lawyers only participate in class action lawsuits which
would benefit their centers' own clients.
B. Compliance Strategies
Instead of advocating for the revocation of the current class action
restriction, recipients of LSC funding could attempt to engage in class
actions by complying with the restrictions set forth in the 1996 OCRAA
legislation. Although compliance with those restrictions may result in
increased costs and inefficiency, class action relief for the poor is
technically possible under current law.
A recipient of LSC funds can participate in class action lawsuits
using private funds only if it transfers those funds to a separate
organization.163 According to the statute, that organization must be a
"legally separate entity" and "must not receive transfer of LSC funds."
l 64
Aside from the organizational requirement, the entity must be physically
and financially separate from the other organization. Mere bookkeeping
separation of LSC funds from other funds, therefore, is not sufficient.
Whether sufficient physical and financial separation exists is determined
on a "case-by-case basis and is based on the totality of the facts.'
65
Congress has described a number of factors that the LSC should
consider when auditing a grantee of its funds in order to determine
whether a separate entity has been properly organized. Relevant factors
that the LSC is required to consider include: (1) the existence of separate
personnel; (2) the existence of separate accounting and timekeeping
records; (3) the degree of separation from facilities in which restricted
activities occur and the extent of such restricted activities; and (4) the
extent to which signs and other forms of identification which distinguish
the recipient from the organization are present. 
166
Although the separate facility requirement may appear to be an
attractive alternative to compliance with the current restriction,
163. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2005). But see Velazquez v. Legal Services
Corporation, 349 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), discussed supra Part IV-B. The
impact of this decision, in which the court issued a preliminary injunction limiting the
scope of the physical separateness requirements discussed in this Section, remains to be
seen. This litigation is ongoing.





significant burdens may arise. The segregation of personnel, leasing of
new physical space, and purchasing of duplicative office equipment may
be cost-prohibitive for smaller legal services programs.
Many commentators have stated that an alternative to complying
with the separate facility requirement is to lobby for its removal. Legal
services activist Alan Houseman has argued that "because the restrictions
are so pernicious, and their impact and ongoing effect so comprehensive,
the reaction against the restrictions should be, conversely, intense and
broad based.' ' 167 He concludes that the goals should "include eliminating
the 'physical separation requirement' that still prevents programs from
using 'other funds' to engage in restricted activities.' 68
Another alternative to the current class action restriction is to
transfer non-LSC funds to other organizations for use in pursuing class
actions. Although Congress passed restrictions preventing grantees of
LSC funds from "circumvent[ing] statutory conditions"' 169 by transferring
the funds to another organization, it did not extend this restriction to non-
LSC funds. A legal services program can effectively "outsource" class
action litigation by transferring potential cases, along with non-LSC
funds, to private organizations. The private organization, which does not
receive LSC funds and is not otherwise restricted, can then pursue the
action. 70 The transfer of the non-LSC funds might be justified if the
potential class action could benefit a substantial number of the legal
services center's clients.
In addition to the transfer of funds to private organizations, an LSC-
funded legal services program could also refer potential class actions to
private attorneys. If a legal services attorney, for example, begins to
review a number of consistent complaints by clients against the same
state or federal agency regarding the same issue, he may refer the matter
to a private attorney who could then organize a class of individuals to file
a suit. Such a referral should only be considered when the ultimate result
of the class action would benefit the legal service center's clients, rather
than the private attorney handling the case.
It should be noted that LSC-funded legal services lawyers are
permitted to assist clients in class actions as long as they restrict their
participation to "non-adversarial activities."'' This restriction against
167. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders, supra note 144.
168. Id.
169. 61 Fed. Reg. 63,749, 63,752 (Dec. 2, 1996).
170. This strategy may not apply if the private organization is registered with the
Internal Revenue Service as a non-profit organization as described in Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
171. See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.2(b)(2) (1998) (non-adversarial activities include "efforts
to remain informed about, or to explain, clarify, educate or advise others about the terms
of an order granting relief").
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advocacy, coupled with limited resources, however, makes this option
unrealistic for most legal services programs.
C. Community Education
A more fundamental change that the LSC-funded legal services
programs should consider is shifting their focus toward creating
awareness of legal rights within the poor community. 172  This
"community education approach" would lead LSC-funded legal services
programs to serve large numbers of clients without being bogged down
by the labor and costs of class action litigation. An emphasis on
community education also would lead the poor community to realize
their rights and assert them both collectively and individually, without
initially attempting to influence actors outside the poor community.
The community education model should be contrasted with current
approaches. Traditionally, LSC-funded legal services programs have
engaged in "first-dimensional lawyering"'173 in which the legal services
lawyer uses legal tools to represent the individual poor client. There are
certainly many drawbacks to this attorney role, as the solutions that it
offers usually are not long-term in nature. Typically, a poor client may
find his situation unchanged because the underlying causes of the harms
suffered have not been addressed by the individual representation.'74
Class actions represent a second approach, embraced by those who
believed that law reform could be effected by increasing social
awareness of the poor community and its problems. This "second-
dimensional approach" utilizes the "trial or legislative session... [as an]
educational or theatrical event that is designed to move its audiences to
empathize with poor people and form political coalitions with them."'
7 5
The drawbacks to this approach have already been discussed above, but
it is important to note that class actions have often been criticized as a
172. For a discussion of this type of approach to the delivery of legal services, see
Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699. Professor White discusses how a lawyer and organizer
educated and empowered residents of Driefontein, a South African village, to resist the
local government's eviction efforts. See also Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek,
Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest
Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 687 (1991); Ingrid V. Eagly, Community
Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433,
(Spring 1998) [hereinafter Eagly, Community Education]; Alfieri, The Antinomies of
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, supra note 106.
173. Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths
from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) [hereinafter White,
Collaborative Lawyering in the Field?].
174. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970)
[hereinafter Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People].
175. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field?, supra note 173, at 157.
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short-term strategy that lacks the ability to effect the social policy
reforms necessary for long-term client solutions.76
The alternative approach would involve LSC-funded legal services
programs aiding poor communities by advising them of ways in which
they could assert their legal rights. By enabling the client to contribute to
the development of strategies that will best serve his needs, the legal
services lawyers also would avoid the dependency problem to which
many clients fall victim. 177 The client would be able to address legal
problems as they arise, rather than having to defer to his legal services
lawyer every time. These approaches also "deepen the solidarity among
poor people, their advocates and allies," potentially giving "poor people
a momentary feeling of dignity, community and power that is too often
lacking in their encounters with the law."'
' 78
Community education may be an important part of achieving actual
client solutions through an alternative model of legal services lawyering.
By being able to tailor community education programs to fit the
particular poor community served, LSC legal services programs would
be able to serve that community more effectively. This model stands in
stark contrast to class actions, where the objective of delivering relief to
specific segments of communities may be disregarded in an attempt to
remedy a larger-scale social problem.1
79
Community education is not as novel an idea as might be expected.
For example, a community education program was developed by the
Philadelphia Unemployment Project over twenty-five years ago. That
program educated community members about their legal rights regarding
welfare, unemployment, and other benefits. Similarly, lawyers
volunteered to help the Welfare Rights Organization educate poor clients
about welfare regulatory law in order to facilitate the receipt of benefits,
176. See supra Part III; see also Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy,
supra note 52; Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the Poor, supra note 84.
177. See Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, supra note 174.
178. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 563 (1987-8). It could be
argued, however, that such measures actually increase the amount of paternalism
inherent in the legal aid lawyer/client relationship. When clients have particular claims,
lawyers are normally guided by those interests; in contrast, the decisions made regarding
what community education would actually "teach" may reflect the values of lawyers and
legal aid directors, instead of the values of the community members supposedly being
served.
179. A coordinated "service" effort involving similar claims against a government or
private entity is possible. This approach attempts to combine first dimensional services
(aiding the client through legal expertise) with second and third dimensional goals
(addressing community problems by heightening social/political awareness within and
without the community). See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems, The Legal
Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977) (discussing "focused case pressure"
as a legal services approach).
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as well as to help increase community political awareness of the "welfare
rights" movement. "8
Community education programs can take many forms, including
educational brochures, manuals, or videos. 181 Self-help workshops and
similar programs "can demystify some of the legal procedures that are
normally monopolized by lawyers and provide the non-lawyer with the
means to improve his own life."' 182 "Leadership development" can also
allow clients to develop their own "tools of problem solving." 183 Finally,
media announcements and public service messages can help raise
community awareness of legal rights and pitfalls. 1
84
The advantages of the community education approach should be
evaluated against the alternative of using LSC resources to bring class
actions to advocate for the poor. One advantage of community education
programs is that they reach members of the community that otherwise
may be ignored in the traditional first-dimensional lawyer model, where
the client has a problem and seeks the lawyer out for use of his legal
skills. 185 Another advantage of community education is that it "provides
an environment for clients to learn about issues relevant to their cases
and to meet others who are facing similar circumstances." 186 In this way,
180. Muhammad I. Kenyatta, Community Organizing, Client Involvement, and
Poverty Law, 35 MONTHLY REv. 18 (1983) [hereinafter Kenyatta, Community
Organizing, Client Involvement, and Poverty Law]. It should be noted that community
education can often increase the amount of legal service required, as opposed to lessening
it through self-empowerment. Community recognition of legal rights may result in
members of those communities seeking to enforce those rights, which may often require
the expertise of a lawyer.
181. See Angelo N. Ancheta, Review Essay: Community Lawyering, 1 ASIAN L.J. 189
(1994).
182. Id. at 212. It should be cautioned that making community members feel more at
ease with legal procedures may not actually simplify the problem-solving process. If
legal procedures are hopelessly complex or archaic, then making community members
aware of such procedures may not be comforting.
183. Id.
184. See id. The 1996 LSC restrictions should be carefully considered in developing
any community education program. LSC funds may not be used to advocate particular
political ideas or encourage political activity. See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.8 (1997). Similarly,
LSC funds may not be used for the organization of alliances, such as federations or labor
unions. See 45 C.F.R. § 1612.9(a) (1997). These restrictions, however, should not be
problematic if the education truly does not entail advocacy of political viewpoints and/or
organizing. Mere appraisals of potential clients' legal rights does not violate any of the
1996 Restrictions. In addition, legal services lawyers also are not allowed to give
"unsolicited advice to a non-attorney that such non-attorney should obtain counsel or take
legal action." Omnibus Consol. Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (OCRAA)
§ 504(a)(18). This restriction can be avoided, as legal services lawyers could still inform
the community regarding the services provided by legal services programs and provide
contact information. See Eagly, Community Education, supra note 172.
185. See Eagly, Community Education, supra note 172, at 472.
186. Id. at 474.
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community education may be more effective than the class action device,
which is limited in its ability to bring clients together. Although class
actions formally join a group of clients together, there is no internal
mechanism for actual interaction among class members. Community
education allows members of a community to consult with one another
and develop a more vested interest in collective efforts for relief or
change.187
Community education can also respond to problems that the legal
system cannot resolve. 88  Class action lawsuits usually only provide
relief in those situations where there was some illegal or tortious action,
whereas community education can help poor community members
address a vast array of problems. Community education also allows poor
community members to address those problems using their own
developed skills, including new leadership skills.' 89  The class action
tool, at its best, may only address specific past harms suffered by the
affected poor community, whereas community education is a mechanism
for remedying harmful situations encountered in the future.
Community education does have its drawbacks. For example,
lawyers may find it difficult to embrace the "collaborative approach" of
community education and often may find themselves "dominating
conversations and decisions about legal strategies."' 90 Class actions, on
the other hand, do not force the lawyer to take on roles, such as that of an
educator, which may be unfamiliar to him.
The strongest criticism of community education is that it may not be
what the poor community desires. 19' Some instead argue that poor
187. Id.; see also Gary Bellow & Jeanne Chain, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some
Comments on Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEo. L.J. 1633, 1666
(1995) (discussing the lack of such organizational support within LSC). If community
education only reaches a small fraction of a community, however, there may not be a
significant impact to the ability of community members to use each other as resources.
188. See Eagly, Community Education, supra note 172.
189. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE, at 70 (1992) [hereinafter LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING]
(asserting that the poor can be helped by community education to "gain confidence in
their ability to handle situations that they would otherwise experience as utterly foreign
and unmanageable"); Kenyatta, Community Organizing, Client Involvement, and Poverty
Law, supra note 180 (noting that "the relationship of equality with the poverty lawyer
[through alternative lawyering aids like community education] ... can help mold and test
the capacity of poor minorities and women to become self-confident community
leaders").
190. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 189, at 79 (noting that "expectations
of how lawyering works frequently get reproduced despite the best efforts of all
involved"); see Eagly, Community Education, supra note 172, at 480 (questioning
whether or not "poverty lawyers, as outsiders to the communities that they serve[,] ...
[can] effectively facilitate the educational process").
191. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law:
Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice
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clients consult lawyers because they have specific legal problems, and
they want lawyers, not fellow community members, to use their legal
skills to address those problems. 92 Certain situations also may not be
able to be rectified through community education and may require legal
services. Of course, there is no readily apparent reason why a proactive
approach to legal aid involving community education could not be
accompanied by the more traditional services of lawyers. 193  Thus,
community education may remain a highly viable "third-dimensional"
lawyering alternative to the second-dimensional tool of the class action.
Finally, arguments regarding the proper role of legal services
lawyers should not tend towards absolutism. Some may argue that class
actions (and the second-dimensional lawyering they represent) are a
superior legal service compared to community education because class
actions are able to represent and benefit even absentee plaintiffs. In
contrast, others may contend that community education is the superior
legal services approach because community education actually informs
community members of their rights. In addition, community education
offers a proactive approach to asserting and protecting the rights of
community members, whereas class actions are narrow and specific in
the relief accorded to the class. 194 A conclusory assertion regarding the
superiority of community education versus class actions, however, would
be unwarranted. Each approach to legal services has its advantages as
well as its disadvantages; consequently, context must be seen as the
crucial factor in determining what type of legal services a certain
problem requires. When addressing the problems of the poor, a legal
services lawyer should keep an open mind in ascertaining his proper role
in order to ensure that clients receive not only the legal services they
need, but also the legal services they deserve.
VI. Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the class action restriction should
be reconsidered. Class actions were once an important part of the LSC's
goal of remedying the past harms suffered by the poor as a class and
preventing such harms from occurring in the future. Class actions once
proved to be an efficient tool for legal services lawyers, preventing the
duplication of litigation regarding the same issues when a government or
Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 929 (1995).
192. See id.
193. Furthermore, the anti-paternalist criticism certainly is not unique to the
community education approach, as it was often leveled at LSC-funded legal services
programs for bringing class actions that allegedly served lawyers' interests more than
those of clients. See supra Part III.
194. See Eagly, Community Education, supra note 172.
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private actor adversely affected the poor community. The burdens of the
class action restriction have proved to be very costly, both for the poor
community and for LSC-affiliated programs.
This article has suggested that LSC-funded programs should
consider strategies that attempt to accomplish both short- and long-term
goals. The effort to overturn the class action restriction on constitutional
grounds is certainly a legitimate approach. Recipients of LSC funding
should also inform Congress of the practical implications of the class
action restriction. LSC-funded legal services programs, however, should
also consider better compliance strategies designed to minimize the cost
to their already thin budgets.
LSC-funded programs should also contemplate their current mode
of operation and consider whether an alternative delivery model of legal
services to the poor should be adopted. For many years, some critics
have advocated the adoption of a "third-dimensional" approach, which
would empower clients to solve their social problems on their own. Prior
to the 1996 Restrictions, most legal aid consisted of the first-dimensional
approach, meaning that the client would approach the lawyer for legal
advice and representation in solving legal problems. In addition, second-
dimensional advocacy approaches, including the use of the class action,
were used in order to heighten public awareness of issues concerning the
poor community. However, the traditional relationship dominated.
The third-dimensional approach would attempt to accomplish the
same goals as a class action advocacy approach. Instead of heightening
the general public's knowledge of the poor community's issues in order
to obtain social and justice reform, lawyers could undertake efforts to
educate the poor community. By encouraging lawyers to act as
educators and counselors as much as legal advisers, the poor community
would be apprised of their legal rights and remedies. This approach
would represent the kind of legal services that other segments of the
population already enjoy and would allow members of the community to
develop their own problem-solving skills.
The adverse impact of the class action restriction on the delivery of
legal services is unambiguous. The restriction has largely eliminated the
class action lawsuit as a means of legal advocacy for the poor. The fact
that the class action no longer exists as a viable option for most legal
services lawyers requires that a new method of delivering legal aid to the
poor community must be developed. Community education, like class
actions, can empower the poor to achieve justice for past harms suffered
and prepare them to face future harms as well.
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